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BEGIN N IN G  with some remarks on past pat­terns of population growth, we consider 
the factors which are likely to lim it this growth. 
These comprise food supplies (likely to be the 
main limit in both short and long term s), renew­
able resources (air, soil, water for agricultural 
and other purposes, non-renewable resources, flora 
and fauna, metals and chemicals, fossil fuels), and 
the second law of thermodynamics (which pro­
vides a ra ther firm upper lim it of 100 years at 
present industrial growth ra tes). Psychological 
aspects of dense crowding and the possibility of 
thermonuclear war are also discussed, although in 
this case no quantative assessment of time can be 
attempted.
Having outlined the salient problems, we turn 
towards the solutions. After remarking on the 
holistic nature of our environmental problems, 
and the time available for a rational solution, we 
note that the bulk of our problems are not 
amenable to ‘scientific’ solution. This is partly 
because the linear methods which have been 
successful in  the physical sciences are largely 
inapplicable, and partly because many of the 
problems simply do not have any technical solu­
tion We conclude with some remarks as to the 
formal structure of the political problem which 
confronts us.
T he tension between population growth and
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environmental resources is in  a sense a problem 
that has always been with us, as it has with all 
other species. W hat is singular about the present 
time is that the comparatively recent patterns of 
rapid growth in population, growth in exploita­
tion of the earth’s resources, growth in every 
parameter which characterizes the hum an condi­
tion, are now beginning to encounter the limiting 
fact that we live on a finite globe. W hile there is 
room for dispute about the details of the time 
scale, there is no question but that this finiteness 
of the earth is within sight of imposing the 
ultimate confrontation between man and nature: 
between hum an systems whose influence has grown 
now to be global, and the natural ecosystems 
that have built and m aintain the biosphere as a 
place suitable for life.
In what follows, I shall first draw together 
various lines of thought to outline some of the 
salient problems, where possible with estimates 
of the time scales involved. (For a semi-quantitive 
classification of problems, complete with magni­
tudes and time scales, see Plat, Science, 166, 1115, 
1969). T hen, with less confidence, I shall offer 
some remarks on the solution to these problems.
1. PROBLEMS
Population
One of the most familiar cliches in the encyclo­
paedia of the apocalypse is “the population 
explosion”. T he problem  of too-many-people 
underlies all others, a fact summed up  in  the 
slogan “W hatever your cause it’s a lost cause
From  T h e  Human popu la tion by E S. Deevey. 1960
unless we control population". It is instructive to 
glance back at the way the world’s population 
has grown over the ages, and to this end figure 
1 displays the evolution of the total world popula­
tion, on a log-log plot (Deevey, 1960).
T he story begins some 200,000 years ago, when 
man first emerged as man, the anim al who used 
tools. This so-called Cultural Revolution (the first 
steep rise in  figure 1) saw m an’s emergence as 
the dom inant actor on the stage. T he total popu­
lation at that time is roughly estimated at around
1 million, an estimate derived from the population 
density for a species which makes its living by 
gathering and hunting food.
This Cultural Revolution had a severe impact 
on the contemporary Pleistocene Megafauna, the 
large mammals typified by the mammoth, masto­
don, sabre-toothed tiger, and woolly rhinoceros. 
In the Old W orld, natural evolutionary processes 
extinguished some nineteen genera over the 2 
million years before the Cultural Revolution. As 
m an’s sway became established, at least twenty-six 
genera rapidly became extinct, leaving the forty 
genera which lure tourists to Africa today; this 
represents an extinction ratio  of 39%. More 
dramatically, in the New World, we find fourteen 
genera extinguished in the 2 m illion years before 
m an’s arrival in N orth America around 11,000 
years ago; in the next mere 3000 years thirty-five 
genera were terminated, leaving fourteen surviv­
ing: an extinction ratio  of 71% which is unam bi­
guously associated with the advent of man 
(M artin, 1966; Ho, 1967). Moreover, large areas 
of the world have probably been reshaped to their 
present ecology by early m an’s practice of hunting 
with fire.1
Two morals may be drawn from this digression. 
Firstly, m an’s large-scale impact on his environ­
ment is no new thing. Indeed it is widely held 
that adaptation to the changes wrought by his 
own activities has played a major part in acceler­
ating m an’s evolution. A certain naive senti­
m entality mars the efforts of otherwise admirable 
people who miss this point. Secondly, notice that 
in the Old W orld, where Pleistocene overkill went 
hand in hand with the developing C ultural Revo­
lution, the extinction ratio was 39% compared 
with the 71% achieved in a brief time by the 
impact of fully post-Cultural Revolution m an in 
the New World. If events move slowly enough 
to permit response to evolutionary pressures, the 
total ecosystem has a better chance of survival.
O ur own epoch is uniquely threatened not from 
the manifold pressures of the environm ent per se, 
but rather because all these changes are taking 
place at far too fast a rate for there to be any 
chance of effective adaptation and feedback. 
(Hardin, 1963): the consequences have no time 
to modify their causes. After the C ultural Revo­
lution, the total population was almost constant 
until some 10,000 years ago, by which time it was 
around 5 million. T hen  with the advent of the 
Agricultural Revolution, which saw men exchange
the role of hunter for that of farmer, there was 
another qualitative change in the world’s popula­
tion (the second sharp rise in figure 1), which by 
5000 years ago had grown to around 100 million.
This second leap was followed by 5000 years 
of relatively slow population growth, and at the 
dawn of the Industrial Revolution, some 300 years 
ago, the world population was about 500 million. 
Then set in the ever accelerating rates of growth 
consequent upon the Industrial-Scientific Revolu­
tion (the third rise in figure 1). By 1850 the earth 
had its first 1000 million or 1 billion people; 
80 years later, in 1930, this had doubled to 2 
billion. Today, 40 years on again, in 1970, we 
have almost doubled again to arrive at 3.6 billion 
people.2 In short, the world’s population has not 
increased in a smooth, steady way, but rather in 
three discontinuous leaps in response to three 
cultural revolutions. One may conjecture that a 
fourth revolution — the Steady State Revolution
— must come in the history of any inhabited  
planet which survives!
Looking towards the future, a m ultiplicity of 
estimates converge on the figure of 6 to 7 billion 
as the world population to which we are committed 
by the year 2000 AD. As Corbet has emphasized, 
the UN estimates have been consistently under­
estimates: the highest of three forecasts made by 
the United Nations in 1960 is already hopelessly 
low.3 Neglecting catastrophic events, this number 
of 6 to 7 billion is rather firmly established by 
virtue of the population patterns of most coun­
tries today, with their preponderance of young 
people. T he estimate assumes that current world 
wide efforts to hold the line at a net population 
increase averaging around 2% per annum  for the 
remainder of the century will be successful. It 
is by no means a pessimistic estimate.4
Beyond the year 2000 AD, we see through a 
glass darkly. It is sufficient to remark that were 
the population to continue to increase indefinitely 
at its current rate, then in 400 years there would 
be one square yard for each inhabitant of the 
globe; the surface of the earth would be covered 
from Greenland to the Antarctic like the Hill at 
a Test Match. And 5000 years on, the earth would 
be a ball of hum an protoplasm expanding out 
into space at the speed of light (a prospect which 
some religions seem to welcome as a means of 
spreading their gospel through the galaxy!) O ther 
authors5 have piquantly observed that the present 
population growth rate is itself an increasing 
function of time, which if naively extrapolated 
implies a singularity in which everyone is squashed 
to death on Friday, 13 November, 2026.
Before turning to consider the factors which 
compete to put a bound on the earth’s population, 
it is well to observe that the present growth rate 
is not purely a T h ird  W orld phenomenon. T he 
table below shows how the various areas contri­
bute to the world population, and their individual 
rates of growth. Worst of the lot is Latin America,
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which brings to the problem a most unfortunate 
combination of religious and cultural circum­
stances. But, by weight of numbers, Asia is the 
dominant factor in the global problem.
Area
Population 
Mid 1969 
(Millions)
Annual % 
Population 
Increase 
(1969)
Africa 344 2.4
Asia 1990 2.0
North America 225 1.1
Latin America 276 2.9
Europe 456 0.8
USSR 241 1.0
Australia 12 1.8
Papulation Bulletin, 1969.
There are those who argue that all this is not 
Australia’s problem. If the current rate of popu­
lation growth continues, by the year 2000 Aus­
tralia will have 22 million people, and even if 
this growth rate of 1.8% were reduced to the 
current fertility rate of 1.2% by discouraging 
immigration, Australia would have 18 million 
people by the tu rn  of the century. These 18 
million will be mainly yoyng, and living in urban 
areas, Sydney will have over 5 million, M elbourne 
over 4 million, and Brisbane over 2 million. 
All other considerations aside, it is as well to ask 
if this is what we want. And, of course, these 
18 to 22 million will themselves have children, 
and contribute to the mindless momentum of 
population growth.
Limits to the world population
T here are many ways in which consequences 
of the earth ’s finite size can intervene to lim it 
population growth. One relatively distant but 
rather inescapable, limit is set by the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. A consequence of this law 
is that the increasing ordering of the environ­
ment needed to sustain more and more people 
must produce an inevitable increase in the earth’s 
surface temperature. Right now, the total heat 
contributed by the sum of m an’s activities only 
comes to 0.1% compared with the am ount of solar 
heat absorbed and re-radiated over the earth’s land 
areas. Meteorologists warn that the world’s climate 
can be drastically altered if this heat generated 
by m an’s activities were to reach 1% of the solar 
energy value. At the current rate of expansion 
of our efforts in ordering the environment, this 
climatological heat lim it will be reached in less 
than a century.6 Indeed in all aspects of popula­
tion, resources and environment, the bounds set 
by the laws of thermodynamics can be critical. 
Many science-fictionish plans for expanding 
energy output, food and water supplies, and the 
like pall when faced with the restrictions of these 
immutable physical laws.7
T he problems associated with the supply of 
renewable resources (air, soil, and water for both 
agriculture and other purposes) and of non­
renewable resources (mineral and chemical depos­
its, fuel for energy sources) will be dealt with
separately below. These pose problems even in 
the absence of population growth. T he above 
limits to population growth would by and large 
seems to be on a time scale longer than the limit 
set by the world’s food supplies. Here the con­
sensus of opinion (as will be detailed below) 
seems to be that the ultim ate bound on steady 
production of food is such that 10 billion people 
is “close to (if not above) the m aximum that 
an intensively managed world might hope to 
support with some degree of comfort-”8 This 
number, 10 billion, is close to the 6 to 7 billion 
we are already committed to by the turn  of the 
century. It is largely these food considerations 
which set the time scale asserted in the opening 
to be within the span of one generation.
T he above factors have in common that rough 
numerical estimates of potentials and limits are 
possible. There remains two other im portant 
considerations for which it is hard to get any 
quantitative feeling, namely psychological aspects 
of over-crowding, and the threat of thermo-nuclear 
war. We shall discuss these first.
Psychological aspects o f overcrowding
T he phenomenon of ecological succession has 
much to tell us about methods of plant and 
animal population regulation. Ecological succes­
sion is that more or less orderly and predictable 
process of community development which changes 
a relatively simple “pioneer” biological commun­
ity into a complex stabilized one. Early stages 
in ecological succession are characterized by low 
density of species, high exploitation of resources, 
and a high ratio between primary production and 
biomass: animal populations tend to be limited 
by resources, and to fluctuate violently. M ature 
or “climax” communities are characterized by high 
diversity, and low primary production relative to 
biomass: populations tend to be stabilized by 
behavioural or other mechanisms, well below 
resource-limited levels.9
Thus one may note that most higher species of 
animals have evolved complex and varied behav­
iour patterns which keep their num bers roughly 
constant from year to year.10 N ature’s birth  control 
can take the form of “territoriality”, whereby 
surplus animals produced by a population fluc­
tuation in any one generation are denied a terri­
tory wherein to m ate and breed.11 Alternatively 
the fecundity of many bird species is demonstrably 
controlled by a behavioural mechanism in which 
parents who breed too exuberantly leave fewer 
descendants, not more, because they are unable 
to care adequately for their offspring.12 Classic 
laboratory studies13 have shown that rats, which 
are normally rather orderly creatures, exhibit all 
m anner of pathological carryings on when overly 
crowded together- Even though abundantly sup­
plied with food and places to live, overcrowded 
rat communities provide a spectacle of social 
chaos, with inter alia, complete disruption of 
m aternal behaviour, sexual deviations including 
homosexuality, hyperactive and totally withdrawn
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individuals: in short, all the forms of aberrant 
behaviour one finds in, say. New York City.
It seems clear that such control mechanisms 
did evolve in primitive man (flattening out the 
first rise in figure 1) and that they have been lost 
almost within historic times. Wynne-Edwards 
writes:
Man in the paleolithic stage, living as a hunter and 
gatherer remained in balance with his natural re­
sources just as other animals do under natural con­
ditions. Generation after generation, his numbers un­
derwent little or no change. Population increase was 
prevented not by physiological control mechanisms of the 
kind found in many other mammals but only by be­
havioural ones, taking the form of traditional customs 
and taboos. All the stone age tribes that survived into 
modern times diminished their effective birth rate by at 
least one of three ritual practices — infanticide, abortion, 
and abstention from intercourse. In a few cases, fertility 
was apparently impaired by surgery during the initiation 
ceremonies. In many cases, marriage was long deferred.1 4
T he thought that pressures generated by over­
crowding may intervene to halt population growth 
must necessarily remain speculative. Nevertheless, 
an authoritative committee of the UN National 
Academy of Sciences has written:
Studies of animal populations suggest that environmental 
factors other than simple limitation of material resources 
may act in unexpected ways to limit populations before 
theoretical maxima are readied. To consider whether 
the earth might support three more doublings of the 
human population is probably to consider a purely hypo­
thetical situation. It seems more likely that further crowd­
ing, the necessary social and governmental restrictions 
that accompany dense settlement, and certain kinds of 
boredom resulting from isolation from nature in an im­
mense, uniform, secular society may prove so depressing 
to the hum an spirit or so destructive of coherent social 
organization that no such population size will ever be 
reached. Current urban problems are perhaps premoni­
tory of what can come in the absence of more effective 
attention to  the broader problems of resources and man.1 5
War
This factor, which may be thought of as m an’s 
own peculiar version of one of the classical 
Darwinian mechanisms of population limitation, 
namely predation (intraspecific), would have 
formed the bulk of any overview of the hum an 
condition of a decade ago; it is a less fashionable 
topic these days, since the treaty banning the 
testing of nuclear weapons in the air, sea and 
space was signed by the USA, USSR, and many 
other countries in 1963. W hile this treaty did 
much for public health it did nothing to stop 
testing. In the 18-year period from 1945 to August 
1963, the US tested ninety-eight “devices”, in the 
7 years since then the US has officially announced 
210 underground tests.16 Moreover the Swedish 
Research Institute for National Defence holds the 
opinion, based on its seismological monitoring, 
that the true US figure is in excess of 400. Thus 
the rate of US testing has gone up by a factor 
of at least 5, and more likely 10 or more, since 
the test ban treaty. T he Russian figures are 
similar. France and China did not sign the 
treaty, and continue to pollute the atmosphere 
radioactively. Consequent upon this testing, as 
of early 1970, the US has deployed 3854 separ­
ately targetable strategic nuclear warheads, with 
the corresponding USSR figures being 2155. T ak ­
ing the highly conservative estimate of 250 as the 
number of nuclear warheads required to devastate 
the 50 largest cities on each side, this represents 
an “overkill ra tio” of about 15 for the USA, 8 
for the USSR17
The present balance of terror does have a 
certain stability. You may be cheered to learn that 
the RAND corporation estimated the probability 
of a full-scale therm onuclear war in 1969 to be 
a mere 2% .18 If this probability remains constant, 
we have a 50/50 chance of reaching the year 2000 
AD. This current stability may be about to be 
disturbed by the advent of the anti-ballistic 
missile, ABM, and the m ultiple independently 
targeted re-entry vehicle, MIRV: deployment of 
either would introduce m ajor uncertainties, and 
consequent instabilities, into the strategic equa­
tion. For these reasons Rathjens and Kistiakowsky 
have recently written:
If counterforce-effective MIRVs, and large-scale ABM de­
ployment, can be stopped, the present strategic balance of 
force levels may endure for some time. If such MIRVs 
are deployed, the balance will unavoidably change in 
qualitative ways. How large an escalation 111 the arms 
race will result will depend on whether agreement to 
constrain or cut back other strategic systems could still 
be negotiated.!8
If present Defence Departm ent plans to deploy 
MIRV go into effect the US arsenal of separately 
targetable nuclear warheads will increase threefold 
(to around 10,264) by 1975, with an estimated 
similar threefold increase in the USSR figures (to 
around 6295).
T he interaction between the arms race and 
the economy deserves notice. When Napoleon 
marched against Russia in 1812 in what was 
regarded as a tour de force of total mobilization, 
he had 1.7% of the people of France in uniform.20 
Today’s “peacetime” USA casually matches this 
percentage with (in 1970) 3.5 million people in 
the uniformed armed forces, stationed in 2257 
bases or locations abroad and in numerous camps 
at home. Another 1.2 million civilians are on the 
Pentagon payroll, and a further 3.4 million work 
in industry on Pentagon orders. Adding those 
whose livelihood is directly dependent on the 8.1 
million Pentagon and military-industry employees, 
some 20% of the US labour force of 78 million 
is estimated to be economically dependent on the 
Department of Defence. More significantly, 63% 
of all US scientists, engineers and technicians work 
on defence projects of one kind or another.
In 1968, Pentagon orders accounted for 27.8% 
of machine shop products, 38.6% of electronic 
components and accessories, 33.8% of other elec­
trical equipment, and 72.4% of aircraft and parts. 
One expects Lockheed (88% of sales to the govern­
ment) to be a m ajor beneficiary; one may not 
expect Pan Am (44% of sales, 1960-67) .21 T he 
Russian figures, although not freely available as 
are the American ones, are likely to be similar. 
T he arms economy is ecumenical- These details
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serve to make clear just how large a reorganization 
ol the economy would be necessary to stop the 
arms race. T he wider environmental crisis is 
plainly even more closely integrated into our 
economic structure, and the changes needed are 
correspondingly more basic.
Food
T he estimate of 10 billion people as the m axi­
mum that can be sustained with some show of 
decency was based on the earth’s ultim ate sustain­
able capacity to produce food. Any such estimate 
is necessarily uncertain. Agricultural experts may 
well say, as Macbeth said to the witches: “If you 
can look into the seeds of time and say which 
grain will grow and which will not, speak then 
to me”. T he witches speak in different voices 
to different people.
However, there is substantial agreement on a 
majority opinion among such bodies as the US 
President’s Science Advisory Committee Panel on 
the W orld Food Supply (1967). or the US N at­
ional Academy of Sciences and National Research 
Council. This opinion foresees roughly 9 times 
the present world food production as the upper 
limit capable of being sustained into the far 
future. T he factor could easily be substantially 
less than 9; an unrealistic upper bound is around 
16 times (although the US National Academy of 
Sciences dismissed this as of “more academic than 
practical interest”) . T he factor of 9 is roughly 
comprised of 2 for the opening up  of new lands, 
another 2 times for increased production, and a 
final approximate 2 for innovations such as dense 
planting of new high-yielding varieties.
T he new lands will be of lower quality than 
those now used, which makes for difficulty in 
realizing the subsequent doubling in productivity- 
In the short term, increases in food production 
must come from increased productivity on exist­
ing cultivated land, rather than from bringing 
more land under cultivation.22 T he main reason 
for this is economic, and reflects the fact that 
most of the readily arable land is already in use. 
T he doubling in production can come in most 
places by use of fertilizers, irrigation, and tech­
nical aids. Currently, unsound applications of 
agricultural fertilizers are disturbing phosphorus 
and nitrogen cycles by injecting these elements 
into rivers, lakes and other systems:23 but this 
is a problem easily cured by sound practices. 
However, the workings of the hydrological cycle 
would seem to set limits to the extent of future 
irrigation schemes;24 this point is discussed fur­
ther in the next section.
T he final doubling must come in part from 
great changes in food habits toward use of the 
primary grains for hum an consumption. T h e  net 
factor 4 coming from production and innovation 
includes the “Green Revolution”, whereby in ­
creased yields are achieved from clever new 
strains, intensively cared for. In practice, the 
Green Revolution is beset not only with economic
and ecological problems of irrigation and fertil­
izing, but also with the ecological instabilities 
inherent in an artificial monoculture: all pfactices 
leading to production of a rich monoculture pro­
mote, rather than mitigate, pest attacks.25 T he 
worsening prospect under progressive intensifica­
tion is summarized in the UN Indicative W orld 
Plan:
As the constraints imposed by poor water control, low 
soil fertility, and lack of responsive varieties are removed, 
pests, diseases and weeds may well represent the main 
obstacle to the continued expansion of food production 
in much of Asia, the Near East, North Africa, and coastal 
western Latin America26.
In arriving at the above rough limits, it is 
necessary to dispose of the myth of abundant 
food from the sea. T he open ocean is essentially 
a biological desert, lacking the concentrations of 
nutrient necessary for significant productivity. It 
is close to shore, in certain offshore areas and in 
a few places where powerful upwelling currents 
bring nutrients to the surface, that food from 
the sea is gleaned. T hus contemporary authori­
ties27 estimate that the ultim ate increase in pro­
duction of food from the sea on a sustained basis 
is not likely to exceed 2} times the present 
amount; an increase by a factor 4 is quite unlikely- 
Futuristic thoughts of harvesting plankton conflict 
with the difficulties of replenishing nutrients 
(fertilizing the oceans), and of harvesting. More­
over, though rich in protein, sea food is poor in 
calories; that is, it is a poor source of energy 
for the body. In short, the maximal expected pro­
duction of food from the sea by the year 2000 AD 
would supply 3% of the population’s energy 
requirements; the most extreme estimates do not 
conceive of this figure as greater than 20%. 
(Ehrlich has summed it up  as “food from the 
sea: a red herring”.)
There remains the possibility of novel sources 
of food, such as direct synthesis using sunlight 
to culture single-cell organisms on petroleum  (a 
dwindling non-renewable resource) or other such 
substrates. A measure of the practicability of these 
ideas is that although they have been bandied 
around for some time, such general processes show 
no signs of contributing significantly to the 
world’s food supply. Possibly the only large-scale 
commercial installation is the British Petroleum 
plant in France which in 1970 started producing 
annually 17,000 tons of single-cell protein, which 
will be suitable for livestock feed b u t not for 
direct hum an consumption. Airy assertions that 
such synthetic production of food will solve our 
problems by the tu rn  of the century seem to 
conflict with down-to-earth extrapolations from 
current trends. However, if there is an “escape 
hatch”, this could eventually be it.
Accepting 9 times the world’s present food 
output as the highest level capable of being sus­
tained, we arrive at a lim iting population of 30 
billion persons. However, bearing in mind the 
widely acknowledged fact that about half the 
present world population is undernourished or
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malnourished, these 30 billion will be supported 
“at a level of chronic near-starvation for the 
great m ajority”.28 T he NAS study concludes 10 
billion people to be the number capable of being 
supplied on a continuing basis in an intensively 
managed world- T h e  scientists of the US National 
Academy added:
I£, in fulfilment of their rising expectations, all people 
are to be more than merely adequately nourished, effort 
must be made to stabilize populations at a world total 
much lower than 10 billion.
T hus althought the figure of 10 billion ultimately 
remains a guess, it is the by no means pessimistic 
guess of the Establishment experts.
So far, we have in this section dealt with fore­
seeable ultim ate limits, largely disregarding pre­
sent political and economic realities. We conclude 
the section with some remarks on the way things 
are going. T he UN, in its Provisional Indicative 
World Plan for Agriculture29 designates the 
developing countries (e.g. Latin America, Asia) 
as Zone C, and notes that merely to m aintain 
their present (inadequate) levels of nu trition  they 
need to increase food supplies by over 80% by 
1985. T o  meet the demands for more per capita 
nutritional intake which would result from rising 
incomes, the increase would need to be 140%, i.e. 
at the rate of 4% per year. T o  quote the superb 
review by Corbet:30
If this extra food is to be produced, rather than pur­
chased, by Zone C Countries, their food production would 
(as estimated in 1962) have had to grow 45% faster d u r­
ing 1962-1985 than previously. Allowing for the time 
that has already elapsed without sufficient improvement, 
this rate would now have to be at least 60%.3<*
This trend lies behind the change from 
the early 1960’s objective of trying to raise Zone 
C nutritional standards, to the present FAO Indic­
ative W orld Plan which aims at trying to m aintain 
the existing inadequate level.
Renewable resources (pollution)
Of all the intermeshing facets of the Environ­
mental Crisis, this is the one coming most clearly 
into the public consciousness, particularly in and 
around the larger cities in the developed countries. 
However, as it becomes fashionable (as well it 
might) to m ount an attack on the problem  of 
pollution, it is well to remember that this is a 
symptom, not a cause. T he task of cleaning up 
our environm ent in the face of a growing num ber of 
people wastefully consuming ever more, is the task 
of Hercules cleansing the Augean stables. (Note 
that Hercules fulfilled this non-convergent task by 
diverting two rivers through the stables: our casual, 
intuitive concepts of infinite sources and sinks 
around us are well exemplified in the myths of the 
past.) Conversely, once population growth is halted 
and we learn to conserve and re-cycle materials, our 
technology is in the main quite competent to handle 
the pollution problem.31
To bring home this abstract argument, note 
that the NSW Electricity Commission envisages 
an eightfold increase in demand by the year 2000 
AD. This factor of 8 comes from a projected 
doubling of the population, m ultiplied by a
projected fourfold increase in per capita con­
sumption. T hus we would need to reduce indi­
vidual power plant pollution levels by a factor 
of 8 over the next 30 years, merely to stand still 
at 1970 pollution levels. This example can be 
multiplied again and again in different contexts.
This point having been made, we turn  to some 
specific aspects of the conservation of the so- 
called "renewable resources” — air, water, soil. 
T he general question of air and water pollution, 
particularly in the vicinity of cities, is receiving 
much attention these days, and we shall not dwell 
upon it.
Also of importance are adequate supplies of 
fresh water for agriculture: plant cultivation re­
quires a throughput of from 300 to 2000 pounds 
of water, depending on the crop, to produce one 
pound of plant matter. In  his search for such 
water, man has in this century increasingly taken 
to tapping the substratum of ground-water re­
serves. T he m aintenance of this "water capital” 
is necessary for the balance of the fresh-water- 
supply cycle. One of the leading authorities has 
written:
By and large our present outtakes exceed considerably 
what the gigantic hydrological cycle of nature returns. 
Due to man's own doing, the land masses are losing water 
and the oceans are expanding. Europe has the record in 
this regard, since that continent takes out three times more 
water than the annual return adds to available water 
resources. North America follows with a rate of outtake 
twice that of replenishment.32
Projected US water requirements in the year 
2000 vary from 700 to 1000 billion gallons per 
day, whereas the most optimistic technological 
and economic assumptions (made in a Congres­
sional study) suggest that only 650 billion gallons 
can be made available 33
Soils are another naturally renewable resource 
which can be destroyed by ecologically unsound 
farming. Short-sighted irrigation practices can 
create saline deserts, as happened long ago in  Iraq  
and Iran, countries which today could not support 
the numbers which once flourished in the Baby­
lonian Empire or the Persian civilization of 
Darius.34 Alternatively, deforestation can lead to 
loss of topsoil, producing the erosion landscape 
so familiar to Australians. In  brief, the conven­
tional designation of air, water and soil as “renew­
able resources” rests on the fact that in nature 
they constitute closed-cycle systems, capable of 
indefinite reuse. In  contrast, the so-called “non­
renewable resources”, such as coal, can be used 
only once. This distinction is obviously a fuzzy 
one, and many of our contemporary habits am ount 
in effect to non-renewable m ining of water and 
soil resources.
Non-renewable resources
U nder this heading come metals, chemicals and 
fossil fuels. Less commonly listed in scientific 
stock-taking of non-renewable resources are the 
planet’s marvellously variegated species of flora and 
fauna. A graph showing the number of bird and 
mammal species extinguished, decade by decade, 
since 1650 shows (as does a graph of virtually 
any variable associated with m an’s doings) an
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exponential increase running  even faster than 
our population growth. At least 164 bird and 64 
mammal species have become extinct in the period 
1600-1965. T he Red Data Books (1969) compiled 
by the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and N atural Resources list as the num ber 
of species or subspecies whose survival is currently 
endangered some 277 mammals, 346 birds and 
more than 79 freshwater fish.
T o exhibit concern with such issues is to risk 
the charge of being emotional. But there are 
tough-minded reasons for preserving this vari­
ability. T o  realize that the East African savanna 
supports 90,000 pounds of wild game to the square 
mile, while the same savanna supports only 16,000 
pounds per square mile of conventional livestock 
(and livestock on well-managed grassland there 
runs around 32,000 pounds per square mile) is to 
realize that we have a lot to learn.35 T he relation 
between the complexity of biological communities 
and the degree of population stability w ithin them 
is a complicated question, and the subject of much 
current research. Moreover these questions are at 
their most perplexing in the species-rich tropics, 
where by virtue of demographic considerations 
their implications for food supplies are most 
critical.
Better understanding of these ecological ques­
tions may enable us to work with nature to control 
pest outbreaks in our food crops by means cleverer 
than indiscrim inant chemical poisons, such as 
DDT and its friends and relatives: apart from 
their tendency to percolate into the general 
environment, such pesticides are increasingly 
presenting problems in that not only are species 
becoming resistant to particular pesticides, bu t 
there is a rapidly growing phenom enon of cross­
resistance, whereby a species that acquires resist­
ance to one specific insecticide will also possess 
a degree of resistance to other pesticides. Clearer 
insight into techniques of integrated biological 
control may enable us to choose strategies leading 
to stability rather than instability.36 U ntil the 
answers begin to emerge, the crassest philistine 
should pause before further simplifying the global 
habitat.
T he finiteness of the earth’s m ineral resources 
can be brought home by asking could we bring 
the 3.6 billion people of the world of 1970 up  
to the American standard of living? T o  do so 
would require the extraction of an am ount of 
iron equal to 75 times that currently extracted 
annually, an am ount of copper 100 times the 
current annual figure, lead 200 times, tin  250 
times. Such a quantity of iron is theoretically 
available and could be supplied by prodigious 
efforts, but the needed quantities of copper, lead, 
tin and many others far exceed all known or 
inferred reserves at the present time. A study of 
the seriousness of this problem37, concludes that 
of the 100 minerals most im portant to  its indus­
tries, the US possesses w ithin its national boundar­
ies adequate supplies of only about 12.
Particularly critical are the total world poten­
tial supplies of phosphorus which in  the previous 
chapter was seen to be a “non-renewable" 
resource essential to life. As an element of odd 
atomic number it is almost two orders of magni­
tude rarer in the universe than its neighbours 
on the periodic table (sulphur and silicon) , so 
that (for cosmological ’reasons!) it is not an 
abundant element. Recently the world population 
has grown at an annual rate of 2%, and the use 
of phosphate fertilizers at 5.3%. T his ratio of 
growths is around 2.7, according well with other 
lines of argument based on fertilizer/yield 
analyses which suggest that use of phosphate 
fertilizers should increase at least 2.7 times faster 
than population. In  a most technical and thor­
oughgoing projection of the future limits of our 
phosphorus reserves, the Institute of Ecology’s 
report to the UN estimates that reserves will be 
used up  in 60 years, stranding a population of
11 billion. At somewhat lower rates of population 
growth, reserves may last for 90 years. W ithout 
phosphate fertilizers, the planet can support 
between 1 and 2 billion pebple.
T he main escape from scarcity, short of total 
commitment to an economy which recycles re­
sources, is technical advance along a broad front. 
Substitutes for many m aterials having special pro­
perties, and for some of the minerals themselves, 
may be synthesized from relatively abundant 
chemicals, particularly if cost is no object. How­
ever, many m ineral resources (for example the 
im portant and already scarce elements of mercury 
and helium) have unique properties, and for them 
there are no satisfactory substitutes. Metals, more­
over, cannot be synthesized from other elements 
except in m inute amounts, and through the use 
of prohibitive quantities of energy.
Cornucopian hopes of large scale future extrac­
tion of metals from crushed granite or from the 
sea do not stand up  well to detailed analysis. T hus 
Cloud has written: “If present conceptions of 
earth structure and of seafloor composition and 
history are even approxim ately correct, minerals 
from the seabed are not likely to compare in 
volume or in value with those yet to  be taken 
from the emerged lands. As for seawater itself, 
despite its large volume and the huge quantities 
of dissolved salts it contains, it can supply few 
of the substances considered essential to modern 
industry.”38 Overall, geologists such as Lovering and 
Cloud39 conclude that the developed countries 
will not fare badly for the next 30 years, provided 
the underdeveloped countries remain unable to 
industrialize significantly. After this m ankind in 
general will do poorly if we have not learned to 
save and recycle.
Finally we turn  to the fossil fuels — coal, pet­
roleum and natural gas. A recent and most 
thorough estimate 40 suggests that the great bulk 
of the world’s supply of petroleum  liquids and 
naural gas will be gone in  50 years. Recoverable 
liquid fuels from tar sands and oil shales may 
extend this period to as much as 100 years. For 
coal the expected lifetime is two or three centuries,
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if used as a principal energy source. It is obvious 
that if we use fossil fuels for fuels, petro-chemicals, 
synthetic polymers (plastics) as substitutes for 
metals, and bacterial conversion to food then we 
shall get through them a good deal faster.
Energy supplies
Even if a stable population, recycling resources, 
is achieved, there remains the less pressing pro­
blem of supplying the necessary sources of energy 
for m an’s journey into the future. T h e  energy 
locked up in fossil fuels or naturally radioactive 
elements is a quite finite resource, not susceptible 
to re-use.
There are three basic present or future sources 
of power: (i) sunlight: (ii) nuclear fission; (iii) 
nuclear fusion.
(i) Sunlight. T he fossil fuels discussed above 
derive from the plant life of eons past, and are 
in effect bottled sunshine. T his fuel supply has 
a finite lifetime, and also has side-effects of 
pollution (particularly atmospheric carbon dioxide 
build-up, which cannot grow much above present 
levels without affecting the w eather).
Hydroelectric energy, whereby useful work is 
obtained from the latent energy contained in 
flowing rivers, also basically comes from the sun 
which by evaporation from the oceans (and 
subsequent rain) provides such water flowing 
back to the sea. Certain technical problems aside, 
this is a source capable of supplying energy on 
a sustained basis. However, the p lanet’s total 
water power, if fully developed, would amount 
roughly to that at present generated from fossil 
fuels. In a fully developed world of 6 to 7 billion 
people, the dem and would be an order of m agni­
tude larger than this.
Neither tidal power, nor geothermal power 
(derived from the outflow of heat from the earth’s 
interior) represents a potential energy supply of 
more than about 2% of that available from water 
power.
T he low density energy present in sunlight 
itself, although daily renewable and enormous in 
total amount, offers little immediate promise 
because of the fundamental technical and economic 
difficulties of achieving the essential concentration. 
T he sunlight-collecting device for an installation 
capable of supplying a present-day city of 1 
million people would have to cover an area of 
about 12 square miles; all else aside, this adds 
up to a lot of metal. A scientific breakthrough 
some time in the future is likely to change this 
picture, but no such prospect is currently in view.
(ii) Nuclear Fission. T h e  fission reactor 
harnesses the energy released when unstable heavy 
atomic nuclei break up into less unstable nuclei: 
the reactor is a controlled A-bomb.
We may say, in very simplified terms, th a t there 
are two kinds of such reactor. T h e  existing 
"burner” reactors consume naturally occurring 
fissile material (mainly uranium -235), and the 
lifetime of our supply of these m aterials can
be measured in decades. T he “breeder” reactor, 
presently in the development stage, uses U-235 
as “seed-corn” to produce other fissile material, 
thus extending the effective supply of fission fuel 
into the indefinite future.
However, quite apart from questions of thermal 
pollution of their environment, all fission reactors 
produce a wide variety of radioactive waste pro­
ducts. W ork on this problem is in its infancy, 
but it is likely that in a world relying heavily 
on fission power, the disposal of these wastes 
would pose grave problems.
(iii) Nuclear Fusion. T he envisaged fusion 
reactor would harness the energy released when 
very light, stable nuclei combine to form the 
even more stable nucleus, helium: the reactor 
would be a controlled H-bomb (as is the sun’s 
in terio r).
For the fusion reactor, all elements in the 
fuel cycle (except tritium ) are not radioactive: 
thus hopefully the m ajor problem of the fission 
reactor does not arise. Also fusion reactor physics 
is such that one may hope to alleviate the worst 
of thermal pollution effects. As for fuel resources, 
the energy obtainable from the deuterium  
(“heavy hydrogen”) contained in 30 cubic kilo­
metres of seawater would be about equal to that 
of the earth’s total supply of fossil fuels!
T he task of constructing a controlled fusion 
reactor has been the goal of research in plasma 
physics for the past two decades. Recent results, 
particularly the Russian machine Tokomak, 
make the outlook hopeful. Two recent UN con­
ferences saw power from fusion as a practical 
proposition by the turn  of the century, if not 
before.
T here remains the problem, alluded to at the 
beginning of the chapter, that the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics sets limits to how much 
advantage can ultim ately be taken of these energy 
supplies.
A recent technical paper by the physicists 
Porter, Hagler and Kristiansen projects present 
trends, and makes very optimistic assumptions 
about the efficiency of future nuclear fusion power, 
to estimate that the global rise in tem perature at 
the surface of the earth may be 0.6 centigrade 
degrees by the year 2000, and 1.2 C° by 2020 
(with increases of up  to 12 C° in the vicinity of 
large urban areas). As noted earlier, such a rate 
of energy release is likely to upset the global 
weather: an increase of 4 C° would eventually 
bring a tropical climate to most of the earth.
These authors conclude that “considering the 
earth as a whole, either the average standard of 
living will place a lim it on the total population, 
or a large population will place a lim it on the 
average standard of living. A more immediate 
problem will arise in the USA from the release 
of large amounts of energy over the comparatively 
small, densely populated areas”.
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In a recent survey of this question41, it is 
suggested that nuclear fusion may well con­
tribute to the solution by the tu rn  of the century, 
and that we are likely to have learned ruefully
10 tap direct solar energy long before energy 
supplies become a limiting factor. These con­
clusions would seem to be in accord with the 
majority of informed opinion. Thus this brief 
section is a happy one. T here seems to be no 
insuperable difficulties associated with energy 
supplies in either the short or long run.
Summary
The foregoing remarks boil down to two basic
points:
•  There are increasingly too many people;
•  These individual people are destroying and 
wasting natural resources at an evergrowing 
rate.
The yearly rate of world use o f fossil energy from 5000 years ago to 5000 years hence.
(From Hubbert, 1962)
FIG 2
T he true singularity of our present epoch can 
be illustrated by the figure above which shows 
the totality of fossil fuel energy (coal, petroleum, 
natural gas) in historical perspective from minus 
to plus 5000 years from the present. Many other 
quantities could be similarly displayed, and it is 
very clear that
11 now appears that the period, of rapid population and 
industrial growth that has prevailed during the last few 
centuries, instead of being the normal order of things and 
capable of continuance into the indefinite future, is actu­
ally one of the most abnormal phases of human history. 
Il represents only a brief transitional episode between two 
very much longer periods, each characterized by rates of 
change so slow as to be regarded essentially as a period 
of nongrowth. It is paradoxical that although the forth­
coming period of nongrowth poses no insuperable physical 
or biological problems, it will entail a fundamental revi­
sion of those aspects of our current economic and social 
thinking which stem from the assumption that the growth 
rates which have characterized this temporary period can 
be permanent.i-
Towards a Solution
The account of the problems drew heavily on 
facts, which were either ineluctable, or else the 
majority opinions of middle-of-the-road experts. 
In contrast, my remarks on the solutions are 
largely personal opinions, and are offered with 
much less confidence.
Interlocking variables
The central tru th  of ecology is that individual 
elements of a complex life-supporting system 
cannot be meaningfully considered in isolation. 
W hat is true of the familiar biological carbon, 
oxygen, or nitrogen cycles is equally true of the 
complex web of variables — population, peace,
renewable and non*renewable resources — which 
characterize m an’s global activities. M uch of the 
concern with our present plight exhibits a deep 
intellectual schizophrenia, which distinguishes 
between respectable aspects (wildlife conservation, 
passive enquiries into air and water pollution) 
and disreputable aspects (birth control, abortion 
law reform, restraint of industrial development) 
in what is really one problem. T he former are 
acceptable matters for political concern, command­
ing Establishment patronage from Prince Philip 
downwards; the latter are not. Ultimately, how­
ever, the problems all intermesh.
I am not saying that we must begin by imme­
diately resolving the entire environmental crisis, 
or else give up. Very hopeful beginnings can be 
made by tackling individual isolated aspects, such 
as air pollution control, or establishing new nat­
ional parks. However, I am saying that eventually 
to solve any one of these facets, we needs must 
solve the whole problem. T o  ‘Iget over the hum p” 
in figure 2, we must assert mastery over the com­
plete set of interlocking variables — peace, popu­
lation, pollution and resources — the unsatis­
factory management of which threatens our 
options for the future.
The time-scale
In stating the problem, we concluded that the 
ultim ate crisis may well not be upon us until 
the turn  of the century. If what is required is 
nothing short of a change in the cultural modes 
of society, then it would seem we must act now, 
for such a fundamental evolutionary change is 
unlikely to be accomplished in  less than one 
generation. I would also argue that the lead-time 
is too short to seek success other than by working 
basically inside existing political frameworks. T he 
time available is surely insufficient to tear things 
down and build a new order from the bottom up 
(despite this p lan’s appealing sim plicity).
Moreover, if this movement does not arise in  
the comparatively free countries of the West, I t  
is hard to see where it will arise. Russia can 
match Lake Baikal against Lake Erie, and so on 
down the line43. In  China since 1949, the tradi­
tional notions of harmony and adjustm ent with 
the environment (apotheosized in the nature 
philosophy feng-shui — wind and water) are 
being consciously and purposefully changed in 
favour of the idea of struggle and mastery derived 
from Marxist thought44. W ith regard to the 
insensate growth economy, communism and cap­
italism seem to differ merely in that capitalism 
is somewhat more efficiently destructive.
Linear versus non-linear problems
An optimistic view of our problems is that 
“science made the mess; given the will and the 
money, science can clean it up .” It is my opinion 
that this view rests on an ignorance as to the 
nature of the achievements of the physical sciences. 
My point is a technical, mathematical one, b u t is 
nevertheless of considerable consequence. Essen­
tially all the brilliant trium phs of the physical 
sciences over the past three centuries are with
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linear problems, in which a very complicated 
whole can be (conceptually or actually) disas­
sembled, studied simple piece by simple piece, 
and then the complex whole reassembled and 
understood as no more than the (linear) sum 
of its parts. T he essential linearity of Newtonian 
dynamics, electromagnetic theory, quantum  mech­
anics and even modern relativistic quantum  field 
theory, makes feasible the study of inordinately 
complicated phenomena as the sum of simple 
familiar elements.
On the other hand, a non-linear system cannot 
be understood by  adding up isolated component 
pieces. One must study the whole, as such. While 
powerful and general mathematical methods can 
be used for linear problems, non-linear problems 
in the Physical Sciences (such as gas-liquid tran­
sitions, or turbulent fluid flow) are notoriously 
intractable.
Such non-linearities complicate all the projec­
tions in Part 1 of this article, and indeed many of 
these estimates of future prospects are either 
invalid or exceedingly optimistic by virtue of 
their total or partial neglect of non-linear effects. 
Some examples of non-linearities have already 
appeared earlier in the chapter, and by way of 
further example we remark that the US Presi­
dent’s Scientific Advisory Committee in 1967 
estimated that to provide twice the present am ount 
of food and support twice the present level of 
population, we would need 6.5 times as much 
fertilizer, 6 times as much pesticide, and 2.8 times 
more power than we have now. T h e  group of 
Establishment heavies who constituted the M IT  
study group on Critical Environmental Problems 
in 1970 pointed out that while global food indus­
tries grow 6% per year, global food production 
grows only 3% per year. T he other 3% growth 
goes to offset the increasing complexity of getting 
produced food to the people. Similarly mining 
grows 5% per year while industries based on 
m ining grow 9% per year: 4% of their growth 
is swallowed up by the increasing complexity of 
processing. T he UN estimate of world energy 
requirements for the year 2000, presented at the 
Fourth UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy in late 1971, foresaw an overall 
rise in the per capita consumption of energy of 
around a factor of 4 (cf. the above factor 2.8 for 
food production a lo n e): much of this factor came 
from the increasingly elaborate efforts required to 
hold the line at present living standards.
T o  get some feeling for a non-linear pheno­
menon, consider the following (admittedly arti­
ficial) mathematical model of a voting process45. 
A very large num ber of voters are each of them 
totally indifferent between two alternatives, “yes" 
and “no” : each voter tosses a penny to decide 
his vote. Clearly the outcome will be 50% yes, 
50% no. Now let each voter interact with his four 
nearest neighbours, so that neighbours have a ten­
dency to vote alike, even though all are still 
individually indifferent. We can measure the 
“strength” of this tendency by a param eter A  . 
T he voting outcome for this mathematical model
is illustrated in figure 3. If the interaction is 
weak ( A  sm all), nothing  happens: the vote 
remains 50/50. However when a certain critical 
value of the interaction between neighbours is 
reached, suddenly opinion begins to crystallize; a 
small increase in the interaction beyond this point 
leads to a community which votes essentially 
100% yes (or, alternatively, 100% no), even 
though everyone is, by himself, indifferent. In 
the lim it of complete interaction ( A »  1), 
everyone follows the first voter.
A  m athem atical m odel of a s im p le  non linear problem  —  interaction between voters
FIG 3
T he two limits — 50/50 with no interaction 
< A  = 0), and 100/0 with complete interaction 
( A »  1) — are easy to understand. T he 
peculiar nature of the transition from one limit 
to the other defies our linearly based intuitions 
(although it may shed light on the instability 
of the polls in the June 1970 British general 
election!). Needless to say, the ecological and 
behavioural problems of the Environmental Crisis 
are exceedingly non-linear. They lie outside the 
scope of nearly all our basic successes in the 
physical sciences. In short, there are solid technical 
reasons for questioning any simple belief that 
science can cure our ills.
Problems with no technical solution
Moreover, many of our afflictions are not sus­
ceptible to any technical solution, linear or 
non-linear. By a “technical solution" is m eant 
one that requires only a change in scientific or 
technological capability, dem anding little or 
nothing in the way of change in human values 
or ideas of morality.
There obviously are problems with no technical 
solution. Indefinite continuance of a 2% annual 
population increase on the surface of a finite 
sphere is a clear example of a problem which 
no am ount of scientific genius can solve. Another 
example is provided by the problem of halting 
the thermonuclear arms race, on which subject 
the experts Wiesner and York have written:
It is our considered professional judgement that this 
dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers 
continue to look for solutions in the area of science and
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technology only, the result will be to worsen the situa-
tion.48
Further examples of major problems which have, 
in this sense, no technical solution have been 
elaborated bv H ardin47.
The contemporary American question: “If we 
can put a man on the moon, why can’t we cure 
environmental ills”? misses this point. T h e  purely 
technical task of lifting men to the moon is simply 
far easier to solve than are the complex political 
and cultural tasks of improving environmental 
quality. In essence, population growth and increas­
ingly wasteful resource exploitation are “no tech­
nical solution” problems, where technological 
cleverness by itself offers no prospect of rescue.
The nature of the political problem
Once it is agreed that the crises which beset 
us cannot be conjured away by technological 
wizardry, we come to the need for political action 
directed towards changing the values and behav­
iour patterns of society.
It is not merely the innate conservatism of the 
human animal which makes such political action 
hard to accomplish. T o  lay bare the structure of 
the problem, we may extend and elaborate an 
idea derived from G arrett H ardin48. Consider a 
crowded pasture or “common”, open to all N 
members of a community. For each individual 
there is a clear gain, which we may call +1, in 
putting one more sheep to graze on the common 
(since the individual gets all the profit from his 
an im al). Accompanying this gain to the single 
individual is a small loss, which we may call 
—e (where e is a very small number, much less 
than u n ity ), to every member of the community, 
arising from the additional overgrazing caused by 
one more sheep. Now although each extra sheep 
put out to graze represents a much greater gain 
to its owner (+1) than it does a loss to any 
single other person (—e ) , it  can easily be that 
the total cost to the community (N times e) 
greatly exceeds the individual’s profit (Ne much 
greater than 1).
There ensues the Tragedy of the Commons. 
For each individual it is logical to add sheep after 
sheep, although the community as a whole suffers 
with each addition. Locked into this insanely 
logical pattern, the community spirals to disaster. 
The literal problem of the commons was solved 
several centuries ago by their enclosure and con­
version to private property. A lthough this historical 
process brought hardship and loss of freedom to 
many, it was clearly better than idly standing by 
and watching freedom in a common bring ru in  
to all.
T he metaphorical problem of the commons is 
with us today in many guises. Factories which 
spew their waste into the surrounding air and 
water do so not from original sin, bu t because 
it represents an economic +1 to them: the con­
sequent —e to every other segment of the society 
would, if summed, generally far outweigh the 
factory’s gain. In many “under-developed” coun­
tries, each additional son represents to  his father 
a +1 who may support his old age, even though 
every extra mouth to feed may be —e to each 
other member of the community. Each blue whale 
caught was +1 to the captor ship, although —e 
to each other whaling interest, until the working 
of the logic of the commons has rendered this 
mammal for all practical purposes extinct.
Nor does it help if thoughtful individuals 
perceive the problem, and abstain from adding 
further sheep. T here ensues a brief pause in  the 
spiral while these people, suffering —e upon —e 
with no compensatory + 1 , are elim inated: the 
remaining community, purged of its more respon­
sible elements, then resumes its Gadarene course'.
Applied to our world, this suggests for example 
that moralistic calls to industry to exercise 
restraint and refrain from polluting or from 
wasting resources would only serve to eliminate 
the more responsible elements' in the industrial 
community — hardly a desirable end. Small 
wonder that industries respond to such moral 
suasion by trying to change their image, not their 
habits. T h e  way to free ourselves from the doom­
laden logic of the commons is not to make self- 
righteous noises, bu t rather to enact coercive 
legislation that governs all equally.
T o  squeeze the last drop from this model, we 
finally note that each person enjoying his fav­
ourable +  1 has a well defined interest, of far 
greater magnitude than any one loser’s —e. 
Individual —e people will by definition have far 
less interest in, or time for, attack than +1 people 
have for defence. T h e  fundam ental political pro­
blem is for the N losers to organize themselves, 
in which event their Ne of collective interest can 
easily exceed 1. W ith a few exceptions (such as 
the Colong Caves conservationists who are putting 
together such a sum of e’s as to rival Portland 
Cement’s +1) this necessary political cohesion 
of the diverse —e people is understandably not 
achieved.
One striking occasion on which “cohesion o£ 
the e’s” was mom entarily achieved was in 1945, 
following the b irth  of the nuclear age over H iro­
shima and Nagasaki. Many people believe that 
time of “peril and hope” (Oppenheim er’s phrase) 
did very nearly produce international control of 
atomic weapons. Certainly a remarkable coalition 
of e’s was forged to combat the vested +1 of 
the nascent military-industrial complex. But the 
moment was unique, and passed, leaving the stajge 
set for the arms race version of the tragedy of 
the commons.
In the present environmental crisis, the best 
hope I see is that when the first truly massive 
ecological catastrophes begin to occur (pick your 
own catastrophe), they may again create the 1945 
atmosphere of traum a, in which it  could be 
politically feasible to legislate against population 
growth and waste of resources. Unlike 1945, this 
moment will not allow itself to pass and be 
forgotten: we will stagger from calamity to 
calamity until we do act.
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